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COMMENTS
The Challenge of Computer-Crime
Legislation: How Should New York
Respond?
INTRODUCTION
D URING the summer of 1983, the FBI identified several
young computer hobbyists in the Milwaukee area who used
their home computers and telephone equipment to break into
business, medical, and government computer systems around the
nation. The youths insisted that they did not intend to destroy or
alter any information stored in these computers, 2 and no charges
were filed against them.$ In a similar case in October, 1983, 4 FBI
agents raided the homes of four California teenagers, confiscating
computers, peripheral equipment,5 printouts, and other informa-
tion which linked them to the unauthorized entry of General
Telephone and Electronics' Telenet. 6 Unlike the firms and agen-
1. Among the computers which were entered were those of Sloan-Kettering Cancer
Institute in New York, Los Alamos Nat'l Laboratory, Security Pac. Nat'l Bank in Los An-
geles, and Gaffney, Cline & Assoc., a Dallas petroleum consultant. Marbach, Beware. Hack-
ers at Play, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 1983, at 42; Drinkard, Computer 'Hacker,' 17, Opens Con-
gress' Eyes, Buffalo News, Sept. 27, 1983, at A-8, col. 4; Computer Security: What Can Be
Done, Bus. WEE, Sept. 26, 1983, at 126 [hereinafter cited as Computer Security].
For a description of the methods used by these youths to enter the computer systems,
see Clark, Computer Pirates, Buffalo News, Jan. 27, 1984, at C-7, col. 1.
2. Marbach, supra note 1, at 46.
3. FBI Keys on Teen Computer Snoops, Buffalo News, Oct. 14, 1983, at A-2, col. 3 [here-
inafter cited as Teen Computer Snoops].
4. Id.
5. Such equipment included modems (modulator-demodulators) (inexpensive devices
which allow computers to transmit data over phone lines), Marbach, supra note 1, at 43
and printers which make copies of data and programs stored in a computer. See generally P.
COBURN, P. KELMAN, N. ROBERTS, T. SNYDER, D. WArr & C. WEITER, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
COMPUTERS IN EDUCATION (1982) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTERS IN EDUCATION].
6. Telenet is a powerful data-base network owned by GTE. It connects more than
1200 computers over telephone lines and has 150,000 authorized users who pay a fee for
their subscription. Marbach, supra note 1, at 44. Other networks include LEXIS, a data-
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cies in the Milwaukee incident, GTE insisted that it would "pur-
sue all available legal recourse, including criminal prosecution." '7
In November, 1983, a UCLA science student was arrested and
charged with using his home computer to break into a multina-
tional Defense Department computer system.8 He was jailed,
pending arraignment, on charges of maliciously accessing a com-
puter system,9 theft, and receiving stolen property.
The escalating severity of the official responses to these three
cases is indicative of the escalating pressure on business, law en-
forcement agencies, and legislatures to resolve the increasingly se-
rious and multi-faceted problems of computer crime. Many diffi-
cult issues are involved: whether laws regarding privacy must be
recast in light of new technical developments; whether the new
technology warrants the creation of a new category of proscribed
behaviors; and whether and when civil versus criminal sanctions
will be more effective. This Comment explores the aspects of
those issues which relate to possible legislative approaches to these
problems.
The Comment presents a brief outline of computer develop-
ment and use and discusses some controversies surrounding the
issues mentioned above, especially those concerning the definition
of the term "computer crime" itself. Varying approaches to legis-
lation which these different definitions engender are surveyed, in-
cluding federal and state responses, with an emphasis on action
taken by the New York state legislature. Existing New York State
legislation is shown to be clearly inadequate to deal with some spe-
cial considerations presented by computer-related crime, while
wholesale creation of entirely new statutes is shown to be undesir-
base used for legal research, and NEXIS, a current-events data base. See generally Pem-
broke, Public Databases: Your Electronic Library, SMALL SvSTmS WORLD, Sept. 1983, at 30
(descriptions of compu'terized databases, services supplied from each, and tips for potential
consumers).
7. Teen Computer Snoops, supra note 3, at A2, col. 3. Note, however, that no charges
have been filed against the Irvine, California, students since the FBI raid in October, 1983.
Computer Crime a Hot Subject in Schools, Buffalo News, Dec. 5, 1983, at A-I1, col. 1. CAL
PENAL CODE § 502(b) (West Supp. 1984) requires intent to defraud or "malicious intent to
access" a computer system. This provision would make prosecution of the boys difficult,
since the requisite intent evidently was absent.
8. Doyle, Student Is Charged With Computer Theft of Defense Dept. Data, Buffalo News,
Nov. 3, 1983, at A-10, col 1.
9. See CAL PENAL CODE § 502(e) (West Supp. 1984). This offense carries a punishment
of up to three years of imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000.
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able. This Comment concludes that the most effective and appro-
priate legislative response to the problem of computer crime is a
hybrid approach involving the amendment of existing provisions
as well as the addition of new provisions carefully drafted to ad-
dress only those aspects of computer crime which truly are
unique.
I. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING PROBLEMS
It is now a truism to say that the computer is crucial to the
functioning of our entire economy, and that this economic depen-
dence affects every other area of society.'" One computer expert
flatly states that "there is no person or organization that is not
affected by the use of this invention."'" He concludes: "There is
no turning back. Society could not revert to the days of manual
processing of information even if it wanted to do so.
''12
Two recent developments in this "computer revolu-
tion"-the proliferation of the personal computer, 3 and the
merging of computer and telecommunications technology" 4-are
of particular importance to the legal community. Small, relatively
inexpensive computers have made personal computer use practical
and affordable; 5 central data-processing departments of large
10. Sokolik, Computer Crime-The Need for Deterrent Legislation, 2 CoMpuTErt/L.J. 353,
355-56 (1980); Lautsch, Computers, Communications and the Wealth of Nations: Some Theoreti-
cal and Policy Considerations About an Information Economy, 4 CompUTER/LJ. 101, 101-02
(1983).
11. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 354.
12. Id. at 355.
13. See Smart, Rolling the Dice in the U.S. Portable Computer Crap Shoot, ELETarONIc Bus,
Oct. 1983, at 66 (portable computers are perhaps the fastest growing segment of personal
computer market). See also A View From the Top, CoMPUTER DECISIONS, Sept. 15, 1983 at 16,
24 (interviews with R. Martini, pres. of Bergen Brunswick Corp., and J. Dembeck, Corpo-
rate V.P. and Treas. of Olin Corp. discussing the "new breed" of executives who depend
upon their personal computers) [hereinafter cited, respectively, as Martini Interview,
Dembeck Interview]. Ticer, Gunfight at High Noon: TI versus the Competition, ELaaTRoNc
Bus., Oct. 1983, at 58 (the U.S. personal computer market estimated at $6 billion in 1983,
up from $100 million in 1981).
14. See, e.g., Gerofsky, Electronic Message Transmission to the Home: Potential Federal Reg-
ulatory Conflicts: Congressional Action Needed, 8 RurGERS COMPUTER & TECL LJ. 305, 310-12
(1981) (predictions that home electronic message services will replace letters, and that Pos-
tal Service will enter electronic message market in 1990's); Sobelman, Retailers Automating
to Improve Bottom Line, SMALL SYSTEMS WORLD, Oct. 1983, at 22, 26 (shoppers can receive
information about products through computer and order through computer network or
over telephone).
15. Miller, Computing On The Go, INFosYsrEms, Oct. 1983, at 52 (users' descriptions of
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business and government institutions no longer have a monopoly
on this tool. Use of the personal computer is increasingly neces-
sary to the work of individual employees and is being purchased in
record numbers by private users as well. 16
Advances in telecommunications have brought long-range
computer power within the reach of these individual users by giv-
ing them the ability to "talk" to other computers at great dis-
tances.17 This combination of computer and telecommunications
technologies has resulted in an entirely new mega-industry,18 re-
sponsible for a completely different approach to the storage, re-
trieval and transmission of information. However, like every
other major influence on society, this development is not without
its concomitant problems:20
For better or worse, the union of these two dynamic technologies appears
destined to work profound social and economic changes, with ramifications
extending far beyond their respective industries. Getting rid of the old re-
gime is just a start. Already politicians and scholars fuss and fret about the
implications, for good and ill, of post-industrial America's metamorphosis
into the "information society." Further in the future, its realization deferred
more for political than technological reasons, looms the "global village," a
whole world wired together by intelligent, high-speed communications
channels.
2 1
personal experiences with portable computers), 62 (predictions of price declines); Miller,
Voice Systems, Picking up Momentum, INFoSYsTEmS, Nov. 1983, at 84 (description of Voicemail
system using computers and telephone lines).
16. See generally supra note 13.
17. Consumers are now looking for ways to communicate with one another using their
new-found home-computer power. See Van Gelder, Modems: Close Encounters of the Computer
Kind, Ms., Sept. 1983, at 61 (writer's experiences with "talking to strangers" through elec-
tronic mail and bulletin board system). Business, of course, is also seeking to take advan-
tage of telecommunications networks through computers. See Dembeck Interview, supra
note 13, at 27.
18. INTERNATIoNAL TRAEADMIN., US. DP'T OF COMMERCE, HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUS-
TRIES: PROFILES AND OuTLOoxs--THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY, A STUDY OF THE COMPETITIVE
POSITION OF THE U.S. COMPUTER INDUSTRY 14 (1983) [hereinafter cited as THE COMPUTER
INDUSTRY]; Hillhouse, The New World of Telecomm, COMPUTER DECISIONS, Sept. 15, 1983, at
95. Lautsch, supra note 10, at 102.
19. Lautsch, supra note 10, at 102. See Ticer, supra note 13, at 58; Smart, supra note
13, at 66; Electronic Mail Links Amdahl's World, COMPUTER DEcIsIONS, Oct. 1983, at 216
(international business use of electronic mail system).
20. See generally 3 INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (1983) (articles concerning
"key social issues" arising from introduction of information technology).
21. Hillhouse, supra note 18, at 95. See also Lautsch, supra note 10, at 115 (public
policy makers need to address potential problems); Information Is Power, COMPUTER DECI-
SIONS, Sept. 15, 1983, at 10 ("techniques unimaginable last year threaten to transform in-
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This rapidly expanding area of technology has caught the law
as well as the layman by surprise. Because of these two relatively
recent developments, behaviors associated with computer abuse
by employees as well as private individuals are becoming more
common, creating, at the very least, serious losses for business and
government, and serious jurisdictional problems for prosecutors
and judges.
Legislators attempting to create laws which justly and fairly
address the issues brought to the forefront by new and perhaps
unfamiliar technology face several difficult problems, some of
which are inherent in any legislative drafting task. For example,
each lawmaker will bring his or her own perceptions of computers
and computer crime to bear on the problem, as well as varying
individual levels of expertise.2
dustries"); CoMPtrrms IN EDUCATION, supra note 5, at 2, 5 (computers will be responsible
for a "cataclysmic change in life style, family structure, work habits and education"; social
class and sex-role bias could be reinforced by differential student access to computers). As
one commentator notes:
Growing dependence upon the computer has created a serious economic, social
and political problem: dealing with crimes involving computers and their data.
The problem has developed at a rate which can only be likened to that of ad-
vances in computer technology itself. It is also a problem as limitless as the
technology which spawned it.
Sokolik, supra note 10, at 358.
For an analysis of the growth of the computer industry in developing countries, and a
description of the constraints which these countries impose on foreign involvement with
that growth, see THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY, supra note 18, at 36-38, 55.
22. This rapid development and accelerated rate of change may be more than the
layman can easily assimilate, and may lead to feelings of awe or fear, tinged with resent-
ment, toward computers, a common reaction to any experience which cannot be easily
incorporated into previous experiential boundaries. Considering the different effects of
computers on our individual "legal consciousness," one writer muses:
On a physical level, the computer is staggering in its ability to. . .manipulate
enormous quantities of information [concerning] money, complex mathematical
equations, physical goods, or repetitive tasks. All fit within the computer's
grasp.
On an intellectual level, .... systems and information science theories have
caused everyone to.. .think in new ways. For instance .... the law has no
consistent answer to the demand to redefine "property" in view of the value of
information in the computer environment.
[The] third kind of reaction. . .[is] a response on a mythical level. [It] does
not affect the way we think, but shapes the stories we tell ourselves when we do
not know what to think .... [U]narticulated feelings about computers affect
the whole realm of computer crime.
Becker, The Trial of a Computer Crime, 2 CoMpTurER/LJ. 441, 442 (1980).
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A. Defining Computer Crime
In any emerging field of law, definitional problems are partic-
ularly troublesome to legislators.23 Computer-related crime poses
special concerns in this area. In the first place, commentators can-
not agree on a single philosophicalapproach as to what constitutes
computer crime, and, therefore, as to the point at which an action
relating to a computer becomes a criminal action. Within the sub-
problem of defining employee-related computer abuse, for exam-
ple, there are four levels of improper use of an employee's com-
puter which concern institutions. The crucial issue is: at what
point should these activities be termed "criminal conduct?"
The first level of employee-related computer abuse is com-
monly referred to as "simple, unauthorized use" of the computer,
and might take the form of the employee playing games, printing
out calendars or personal correspondence, keeping small amounts
of personal information in his or her files, or breaking the organi-
zation's computer security codes to view protected data "for the
fun of it. ' 24 At this level, neither monetary gain to the employee
23. An especially vexing definitional problem is that, even within the computer indus-
try, there is no general agreement on the basic definition of "computer."
Within the [computer] field, four powerful trends-dramatic improvements in
computer capabilities, rapid evolution of their physical characteristics, steady
expansion of their application and usage, and constant enhancement of their
embodied price/performance ratios-have all necessitated constant modifica-
tion of the standard labels used in computer product classification. Even then,
the terminology always trails the marketplace.
THE COMPUrER INDUSTRY, supra note 18, at 14.
"Experts" writing in the field range from attorneys (Susan Nycum) to technologists
(John Taber) to researchers (Donn Parker). See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, US. DEP'T OF
JUSTIcE, COMPUTER CRIME. ELECrtoNIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND COMPUTER CRIME 39,
Exhibit 4-1 (1982) (comparing definitions of computer crime by Carroll, Parker, Schabeck
and others) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcS]; Note, Addressing Computer
Crime Legislation: Progress and Regress, 4 COMPUTER/L.J. 195, 196-97 (1983) (comparing def-
initions of Parker, Taber, Ingraham, and Nycum). Parker's definition of computer abuse is
the broadest: "Any intentional act associated in any way with computers where a victim
suffered, or could have suffered, a loss, and a perpetrator made, or could have made, a
gain." Parker, Computer Abuse Research Update, 2 CoMPtrrER/LJ. 329, 333 (1980). See also
Kling, Computer Abuse and Computer Crime as Organizational Activities, 2 COMPUTER/LJ. 403,
407 (1980) ("computer abuse" is a better term than "computer crime" or "computer
fraud," since it allows "a larger variety of problematic practices to be addressed").
24. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 368. For a discussion of the possibility that the provi-
sions in pending federal legislation may be interpreted as criminalizing such activities, see
infra notes 138-42, and accompanying text. See also People v. Weg, 113 Misc. 2d 1017, 450
N.Y.S.2d 957 (1982) (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.) (employee alleged to have used his employer's
computer to trace racehorse bloodlines and to prepare and print his resume). For a more
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nor intent-to harm the employer is involved; this would seem to
be relatively innocuous behavior of the sort that most program-
mers vehemently defend.2 5 However, some experts have offered
the opinion that this form of computer abuse is "prevalent," and
"can cause, in the aggregate, serious disruption of the employer's
computer operations." 26 In addition, whether carried on by em-
ployees or by outside computer users who gain access to the sys-
tem without authorization, these so-called "harmless" activities
may later develop into deliberate misuse of the system.27 The next
level of computer abuse is unauthorized use of the employer's
computer for personal gain unrelated to the main function of the
computer, a form of "moonlighting" using the employer's com-
puter facilities. In one case, programmers used their employer's
computer for their own computerized sheet-music arranging com-
pany.28 More serious yet is the third level of abuse, where an em-
ployee manipulates the computer, using a fraudulent scheme in a
clearly criminal act, in such a way as to give him or her gain to the
detriment of the employer, the public, or the employer's custom-
ers. 29 Finally, an employee can use computer skills to intentionally
sabotage the employer's operations or erase crucial data.30 Vari-
ous attempts at definition have considered all these activities as
complete discussion of the underlying facts of this case, see N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1983, at 2,
col. 3.
25. See generally Taber, On Computer Crime (Senate Bill S. 240), 1 CoMPUraR/L. J. 517
(1979).
26. Raysman & Brown, Computer Law: Evolving Statutes on Computer Crime, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 11, 1983, at 1, 2, col. 1.
27. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 368.
28. United States v. Kelly, 507 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The programmers were
charged with theft of computer services, but they were convicted of. mail fraud because
they failed to state in their advertising brochures that they were using their employer's
computer. In one case, a $5000-per-week bookmaking operation at a Ford Motor plant was
exposed. Employees had used the company's word processor to store information and to
print out betting tickets. Data Gathered on Computers' Role as Accomplices, L.A. Daily J., Apr.
8, 1983, at 14, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Data Gathered].
29. See, e.g., People v. Calandra, 117 Misc. 2d 972, 459 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1983)
(vice president of New York bank's commercial loan department charged with grand lar-
ceny for allegedly diverting funds to co-defendants in guise of loans transferred by com-
puter to "borrower's" checking accounts). The-Los Angeles District Attorney's office re-
ported the case of an employee who tapped into his employer's computer to alter his
income tax records to show a larger withholding. See Prosecutors Thy to Curb Growing Com-
puter Crime, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as GROwiNG COM-
PUTER CRIME]. The employee intended to claim a larger refund. Id. at 16, col. 2.
30. See Miles, Disgruntled Employees, CoMPUTER DEcisIONS; Oct. 1983, at 210.
AA
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well as others to be within the category of "computer crime. 3 1
One commonly held view is that "the computer has changed
both the form and the means by which the traditional crimes...
of fraud, theft, larcency, embezzlement, sabotage, extortion and
conspiracy are perpetrated . . 2 Although some writers clas-
sify these behaviors as "a new array of criminal conduct,"'3 such
activities do not constitute a completely different category of
criminal behavior at all. To consider illegal computer-related be-
havior other than as ordinary crime which uses a computer either
as a tool (as in thefts of money or information), a subject (as in
computer date-matching frauds), or an outright object of attack
(as in physical destruction of computer disks or terminals) 34 is to
assume erroneously that just because computer technology is new,
any behavior related'to it must also be new.35 Consequently,
lawmakers should examine carefully the related assumption that
completely new legislation must be drafted in order to deal effec-
tively with these problems. As developed below, they can use any
one or a combination of three basic approaches to criminalizing
computer-related conduct: an asset/loss approach," a behavioral
approach,37 and a victim/perpetrator approach.3 8
31. Raysman & Brown, supra note 26, at 1, col. I (behavior which has been termed
"computer abuse" ranges from using the employer's computer to play games to deliber-
ately causing patient's death by altering medical files).
32. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 362, 364.
33. Id. As one government study noted:
Many computer-related crimes can be prosecuted successfully without delving
deeply into the technology. Many more of them, however, are sufficiently dif-
ferent from traditional crimes relative to the occupations of perpetrators, envi-
ronments, modi operandi, forms of assets lost, time scales, and geography to
identify the subject as a unique type of crime that warrants explicit capabilities
and action.
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE
MANUAL: COMPUTER CRIME, at 1 [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL].
See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 23, at 40.
34. D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER 17-18 (1976).
35. Ingraham, On Charging Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER/LoJ. 429, 429 (1980).
36. This approach asks: What did the victim have and what did he or she lose? D.
PARKER, FIGHTING COMPUTER CRIME 244 (1983) (focusing on asset/loss aspect of computer
crime is more useful and usable concept than focusing on "technical" means of causing
loss, as it avoids having to identify rapidly changing technology that could make statutes
obsolete).
37. This approach asks: How was the crime committed? See Note supra note 23, at
196-97 (discussing Susan Nycum's adoption of this approach).
38. See Kling, supra note 23, at 411.
784 [Vol. 33
COMPUTER-CRIME LEGISLATION
Each approach emphasizes a different aspect of the criminal
behavior involved. The asset/loss approach defines computer
abuse by focusing on the harm incurred-that is, on the assets in-
volved and the valuation of their loss. 9 Under this approach, ap-
propriate categories might be financial crime (taking money via
computer), informational crime (taking valuable data via com-
puter), theft of property (taking computer merchandise for sale or
personal use), theft of services (unauthorized use of a computer
system), and vandalism (intentional damage or destruction of a
computer or computer material).4 0 Legislation based on this ap-
proach could very likely use and modify existing statutes, since a
well defined legal structure already exists to punish offenses
against property. The major modification necessary would be the
inclusion of computer-type assets in the statutory definitions of
property.
41
Others who have studied the problem of the definition of
computer crime prefer to focus on the methods used by computer
abusers.42 The question becomes, then, not how much did the vic-
tim lose, but how was the abuse perpetrated? Under this approach,
the categorization of various intrusive behaviors depends upon an
understanding and analysis of the physical make-up of the com-
puter system. For example, abuses can be grouped according to
"the manner of misappropriation," 4 focusing on the fact that one
can obtain information from a computer system through "five key
points": (1) the data entered into the computer; (2) the programs
used to run it; (3) the electronic components of the central
processing unit; (4) the printed or coded output, and (5) the re-
mote transmission of information over telephone lines or micro-
waves.4 4 At each point, a determination of how the abuse is com-
mitted is critical.45 Since the criminal behavior is defined in
relation to the new technology, it is perceived as an entirely new
type of behavior which would require the proscription of entirely
39. Note, supra note 23, at 197.
40. Id.
41. A number of state statutes have adopted this approach: See infra note 142.
42. See, e.g., Note, supra note 23, at 197, 198 (describing the approach of Nycum).
43. Id. at 197.
44. Id.
45. Note, supra note 23, at 198 (describing contention of Sokolik). But see BUREAu OF
JUSTICE STATISTiCS, supra note 23, at 17 (distinguishing consumer, corporate, and internal
crime, thus placing emphasis on where abuse is committed).
7851984]
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new legislative provisions.4 1
A third approach is to focus on the identities of perpetrators
and victims. 47 This scheme differentiates between computer
crimes committed by individuals and those committed by busi-
nesses, the latter being an area which most analysts have ig-
nored.48 Categories of computer crime in this approach are nearly
congruent with categories of white-collar crime:
1. Crimes by persons operating on an individual, ad hoc basis, for personal
gain in a non-business context (. . . personal crimes). 2. Crimes in the course
of their occupation by those operating inside businesses, Government, or
other establishments, or in a professional capacity, in violation of their duty
of loyalty and fidelity to employer or client (. . . abuses of trust). 3. Crimes
incidental to and in furtherance of business operations, but not the central
purpose of such business operations (. . . business crimes). 4. White-collar
crime as a business, or as the central activity of business (. . . con games).
49
Several states have recognized these distinctions by including a
separate scheme of penalties for violations by organizations as op-
posed to violations by individuals. 0
In summary, although computer related crime is not necessa-
rily a new type of criminal behavior, it does not fit easily within
existing legislative definitions. In deciding which of the many at-
tributes of computer crime to emphasize in a definitional or classi-
fication scheme, legislators must become attuned to such defini-
tional differences, since the determination of what constitutes a
crime must necessarily affect the legislation drafted to proscribe
it.
The present language of many existing state penal laws is sim-
ply too narrow to encompass computer technology and the con-
cepts which accompany it.51 Technology has outpaced legislation,
46. See, e.g., N.Y.S. 8977, 207th Sess. §§ 146.05-.10 (computer trespass), 146.20-.25
(computer tampering) (1984).
47. See, e.g., Kling, supra note 23, at 412.
48. Id. at 411.
49. BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATITICS, supra note 23, at 61. See Edelhertz, The Nature,
Impact and Prosecution of White-Collar Crime. 73 app. A (1970). State computer crime stat-
utes which provide for greater penalties for corporations are: AMu REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2316 (1978 & Supp. 1984-1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-104 (Cum. Supp. 1984); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 1984).
50. ALAsxA STAT. § 11.46.985 (1978); ARm REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316 (1978 & Supp.
1984-1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-102 (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703
(Supp. 1984).
51. Marbach, supra note 1, at 46 (quoting Harvard law professor Miller as decrying
786 [Vol. 33
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and the language of these statutes either does not apply at all or
must be stretched to cover computer-abuse situations. Prosecutors
complain that they are forced to "shoehorn" computer offenses
into laws which were drafted long before computers were
invented.
52
The inadequacy of existing legislative provisions is evidenced
not only by their failure to provide a sufficiently comprehensive
definitional scheme but also by the fact that the mechanisms they
employ for valuing losses may well be inappropriate in the context
of computer crime. Obviously, these problems are interrelated.
Assume, for example, that legislators could agree on a simple defi-
nition of computer program: "The list of instructions that tells a
computer to perform a given task or tasks."' 53 If a person destroys
or sabotages a "program" in a computer, what, exactly, is lost? Is
the program a product, or is it a service? Is it a tangible object or
a set of intangible electronic impulses? If it is intangible, can it still
be "property?' 54 Suppose further that a caller electronically trans-
fers intangible information (either a computer program or other
data stored in a computer) from a computer in one location to
another. Even if that information is printed out at the intruder's
end of the transaction, it also remains in the original computer. Were
the language of existing larceny statutes to control, would it be
reasonable to conclude that such information had been "taken"
or that its owner had been "permanently deprived" of its use? 5
"horse-and-buggy laws in a Buck Rogers era").
52. Computer Security, supra, note 1, at 130. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 507 F.
Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (defendants who used employer's computer for personal sheet-
music arranging business convicted on mail fraud charges instead of for theft of computer
services). See also Note, supra note 23, at 201 (discussion of shortcomings of traditional
criminal laws when applied to computer crimes); Lautsch, supra note 10, at 106 (difficulty
of conceptualizing "software" and "firmware").
53. COMPUTERS IN EDUCATION, supra note 5, at 256.
54. See Ward v. Superior Court, 3 COMP. L. SERV. REP. 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972).
55. See id. Ward, brought under California Penal Code § 499c(b) (West 1970), held
that electronic impulses transmitted over telephone line were not tangible articles within
the meaning of the statute. See also United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1978) (defendant convicted of wire fraud only because he used tele-
phone across state lines; the case illustrates the difficulty of applying traditional concepts of
"property" and "taking" to electronic impulses). But see, e.g., Hancock v. Texas, 402
S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), affd sub nom. Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 522 (5th
Cir. 1967) (computer software is property, even if intangible).
"The interpretation of whether acts of theft or damage to computer programs are
crimes varies widely from state to state. The answer often hinges on whether a computer
7871984]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The problem is complicated further by the fact that, in many
states, information is not given the statutory protection accorded
to tangible property."'
Clearly, better definitional and valuation guidelines are
needed to assess the damage from computer crime. 7 Since com-
puter information may not be protected under existing statutes,
valuation of the harm done to the victim might have to be as-
sessed in terms of computer time used, which is measured only in
milliseconds, rather than in terms of the value of the information.
In any situation concerning the theft of a computer program or of
information stored in a computer,
it would clearly frustrate the rightful owner's reasonable and understandable
expectation [of justice] to be told that he had suffered no wrong that the
court would hear until the form of unlawful possession became one which
could be folded into a glider. For the very practical purpose provided by the
program [i.e., running the computer], reduction to print on paper would be
wholly irrelevant."
One possible way to view and value the loss to an owner of a
computer program which is misappropriated through electronic
stealth is to note that he or she no longer enjoys exclusive or as
much control over dissemination of the information contained
therein.5 9 However, if the concept of computer-stored informa-
tion were incorporated into a state's larceny statute under the def-
inition of property, and the definition of "appropriation" covered
program is considered property under a state's statutes or case law." Volgyes, 2 COMPtrrra/
LJ. 385, at 399 (1980). See Note, supra note 23, at 199 (notion exists in law of theft that in
order to be termed "stolen," property must be tangible and must physically change
possession).
New York's larceny statute defines property as "money, personal property, thing in ac-
tion, evidence of debt or contract, or any article, substance or thing of value, including any
gas, steam, water or electricity, which is provided for a charge or compensation." N.Y.
PE.AL LAw § 155.00(1) (McKinney 1975). Provisions (3) ("Deprive") and (4) ("Appropri-
ate") both state that criminal behavior occurs if the major portion of the property's eco-
nomic value is lost to the owner.
56. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, THE INVESTIGATION
OF WHITE COLLAR CIME" A MANUAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AoENCI.s 2 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as WHrrE COLLAR CRIME].
57. See Note, supra note 23, at 200. Depending on the definition, a program could be
worth the $12 cost of the disk it is written on or the $25,000 worth of business it means to
a company. See also Volgyes, supra note 55, at 399 (even in states which have passed com-
puter abuse laws, if the "actual monetary value of the lost program is not clear, its theft
may be only a misdemeanor").
58. Ingraham, supra note 35, at 433.
59. CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 33, at 141-42.
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situations in which computer programs and data were copied but
not printed out, no convoluted interpretations of the taking and
the resultant loss would be necessary. 0
Without clear statutory provisions which encompass intangi-
ble electronic impulses, the law continues to be ambiguous. "The
price of [this] uncertainty in [the language of the] criminal law is
not paid by the prosecutor, but by the victim and the community
whose interests are thereby excluded from consideration by the
courts."' I This ambiguity can and should be corrected with defini-
tions designed to cover new technological areas. However, in
drafting new legislation, care must be taken to include only those
60. Recognition of a property right in intangible information stored in a computer
would follow a general trend in other areas of the law. Fourth amendment search and
seizure law, for example, shows a movement away from a general judicial hesitance to rec-
ognize a privacy interest in the (intangible) spoken word. Though courts once were reluc-
tant to curtail electronic surveillance activities as unconstitutional invasions of privacy, re-
cent decisions have recognized that the "search" of a person's words by means of
electronic surveillance without his or her permission is as much an invasion of privacy as a
warrantless search of tangible papers or possessions. See generally A. MITLER, THE ASSAULT
ON PRIVACY (1971); Galloway, The Uninvited Ear: The Fourth Amendment Ban on Electronic
General Searches, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 993 (1982) (long-range electronic surveillance is a
general search, despite fact that person is not touched physically; such surveillance must
therefore be subject to the requirements and restrictions of the fourth amendment);
Carter, Book Review, 93 YALE L.J. 581 (1984) (reviewing I. PooL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREE-
DOM (1983)); Gillers, Book Review, 92 YALE L.J. 731 (1983) (reviewing R. BERGER, DEATH
PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COtRT'S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982)); McNulty, Dalia v. United
States, The Validity of Covert Entry, 65 IowA L. REv. 931, 933-39 (1980) (tracing develop-
ment of fourth amendment law as it applies to interception of communications).
Further developments in technology warrant further refinements of the concept of
"search and seizure" and the language used to describe violations in this area. The present
federal wiretap statute forbids unauthorized monitoring of conversations except for law
enforcement officers who have obtained a warrant. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2516 (1982); 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2511, 2516 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984). However, conversations are now possi-
ble via computer; when an individual types a message into his or her computer, the mes-
sage is converted into electronic impulses which can be sent to another computer via tele-
phone wires. But the federal statute defines prohibited interception of another's
communications as "the aural interception of information," id., a definition into which
electronic bits and bytes simply cannot fit. Civil liberties groups are concerned that this
discrepancy creates a dangerous opportunity for governmental abuse of individual privacy.
Loophole in Law Allows Interception of Computer Data, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 12, col.
3. Local, state, or federal law enforcement officers might conduct computerized electronic
surveillance without the court approval required for conventional wiretaps. By monitoring
telephone calls and electronic mail, authorities can gather information about an individ-
ual's dealings with others which could be used to establish relationships among members of
organized groups. Id.
61. Ingraham, supra note 35, at 436.
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definitions which are necessary, and to avoid technical jargon. 2
Once the definitions are clear, valuation of such intangible assets
should be easier.
B. Other Legislative Drafting Considerations
1. Prosecutorial discretion. Effective computer-crime legislation
could greatly mitigate the dangers of prosecutorial discretion.
The leeway law enforcement officials are afforded under present
statutes is illustrated by the comments of one federal prosecutor
who declared that his office would be reluctant to prosecute teen-
agers who enter a computer system with no intent to deprive be-
cause "[i]t would be excessive to prosecute this matter as a five-
year felony.""3 Although a computer criminal may cause damage
to computer files worth hundreds of thousands of dollars,6 4 he or
she, if prosecuted at all, may well receive an extremely light sen-
tence simply by virtue of being a teenager or white-collar
worker. 5 Moreover, light sentences are sometimes handed down
when the prosecution finds it too difficult even to establish the
value of the harm done to the victim.66 This often occurs when
information rather than money is taken, or when information in
computer files is destroyed or altered. 7 A consistent prosecutorial
policy must be evolved in these cases, but clear statutory provi-
sions are a necessary first step toward achieving such a policy.
62. Id. at 437.
63. Marbach, supra note 1, at 47 (quoting Rudolph Guiliani) (Marbach mistakenly calls
him "Richard").
64. The value of any particular computer file, of course, depends on the method of
valuation. See supra note 57.
65. See generally WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 56, at 1, 2, 8-10 (discussion of pub-
lic's and prosecutors' perceptions of "real" crime and white-collar crime and reasons why
prosecutors are reluctant to accept cases of white-collar crime). See also Sokolik, supra note
10, at 372 (discussion of discrepancy in sentencing); Becker, supra note 22, at 454 (exam-
ples of light sentences). But see Nagel & Hagen, The Sentencing of White Collar Criminals in
Federal Courts: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1427 (1983) (no em-
pirical support for contention of sentencing disparity).
66. Note, supra note 23, at 200.
67. See Roddy, The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, 7 J. COMPUTERs, TECH. & L.
343, 364 & n.150 (recommends sentencing guidelines rather than a rigid statutory stan-
dard so that "the courts can tailor penalties commensurate with the seriousness of the
crime"). See also infra notes 57-62, and accompanying text (dealing with valuation of com-
puter-related material).
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2. Inexperience of prosecutors, judges, juries. Many prosecutors,
judges, and juries are handicapped by inexperience with computer
technology, and those in states which already have computer
crime bills are further handicapped by lack of experience dealing
with and interpreting these laws.6 8 Limited computer literacy may
make some prosecutors reluctant even to accept a case involving
computer crime, particularly if the victim's losses are small."9
As a practical example of the difficulties authorities face in a
case of this type, a prosecutor who wishes to search a computer
file for a particular piece of information must (1) have the neces-
sary technical knowledge to do so, and (2) draft a search warrant
such that the judge will also understand what the prosecutor is
looking for and how it can be recognized.7 0 Some agencies have
instituted educational programs to introduce prosecutors to com-
puter technology and the techniques of successfully prosecuting a
case of computer abuse,7 1 but the effects of non-computer-literate
prosecutors, judges, and juries will probably be felt for at least
another generation.7 2 In the meantime, the most non-technically
68. BUREAU OF JUSTIE STATISTICS, supra note 23, at 38.
69. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 360; Raysman & Brown, supra note 26, at 1, col. 1.
70. Becker, supra note 22, at 443. One prosecutor's personal statement concerning
this issue was that:
I was wholly unprepared on the iatal morning when my boss told me to write a
search warrant for the recovery of a computer program that a citizen was com-
plaining had been stolen. The following hours convinced me that I had much
to learn, and but for luck we may well have had to leave unredressed a theft
that was later valued at $0.5 million.
Ingraham, as quoted in Foreword to CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 33, at
xxxvii (commenting on his involvement with Ward v. Superior Court, 3 CoMP. L. SERv. REP.
206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972)).
71. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ISSUE BRIEF,
COMPUTER CRIME AND SECUlrrIY 10 (updated Oct. 19, 1983) (description of FBI academy's
program) [hereinafter cited as ISSUE BRIEF]; Cannon, Computer Criminals Climbing to the Top
of FBI Wanted List, Buffalo News, Nov. 20, 1983, at A-13, col. 1. However, Parker indicates
that the FBI program, originally four weeks long, now cut to three weeks for lack of funds,
is too short and uncomprehensive. D. PARKER, supra note 36, at 239.
72. D. PARKER, supra note 36, at 239. Ingraham comments: "If so esteemed a leader of
the legal profession as retired Associate Justice ArthurJ. Goldberg can flaunt his ignorance
of computer technology, it should not be thought that the courts will soon be as familiar
with computers as they have become with horseless carriages." Ingraharp, supra note 35, at
438 (footnote omitted, citing Beeler, Ex-Justice Goldberg Sees Privacy Major Issue, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Apr. 9, 1979, at 20, col. I). One guidebook advises prosecutors to "[m]ake
the whole case as basic, simple and free from computer technology and terminology as
possible.. . . [J]uries do not have to understand telephony to convict an obscene telephone
caller." CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 33, at 125. It advises them to use
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oriented legislation possible should be used in computer abuse
cases. It follows that making judicious use of familiar legislative
language and provisions would be most effective.
3. Uncertain jurisdiction. Uncertain jurisdiction presents seri-
ous obstacles for both federal and state authorities. Although fed-
eral prosecutors may be somewhat better equipped to deal with
computer crime than their counterparts at the state level, they do
not always have jurisdiction to enter the investigation, and often
must proceed under a related statute such as one addressed to tax
evasion or wire fraud." The question of jurisdiction can be
equally perplexing for state authorities, when, for example, a
court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over an out-of-
state telephone caller who accesses a local computer without
authorization."
4. Attitudinal obstacles. The white-collar employee who uses a
computer to defraud or to steal data from a public or corporate
institution very often has no previous police record, and, like the
computer hacker, rationalizes that so impersonal an activity could
hardly be considered a crime against other persons."
In addition to the rationalizations of outside computer abus-
ers and employees, two other attitudinal factors create problems
for business and law enforcement. First is the "heroizing" which
simple analogies of technical concepts to familiar objects; e.g., magnetic disk - phono-
graph record. Id. On the other hand, prosecutors complain that "the victim's records and
documentation of crimes associated with computers in the business community are inade-
quate for effective prosecution." Id. at 2.
73. For a list of some of the 40 or more federal criminal statutes which may be used to
prosecute computer crimes and abuse, see Volgyes, supra note 55, at 396-97.
74. A federal computer crime statute "would remove the requirement that telephones
or other forms of illicit computer penetration take place across a state line in order to
justify federal prosecution." Sokolik, supra note 10, at 379.
75. For a discussion of some ethical issues faced by computer users, see D. PARKER,
supra note 36, at 187 (ethics questionnaire answered by students and businessmen), 191-
226 (chapters on ethical and moral situations). Parker claims that even though more indi-
viduals use computers in the course of their work, "opportunity is not the basis of most
computer-related crimes. The acts are usually committed by amateur white-collar criminals
who are trying to solve deep personal problems." Parker, Book Review, COMPUTER DECI-
sIONS, Oct., 1983, at 234 (reviewing A. NORMAN, COMPUTER INSECURITY (1983)) (emphasis
added) These individuals may consider their actions to be "borrowing" rather than steal-
ing, and the impetus may be financial stress brought on by alcoholism or drug abuse. Alter-
natively, the motive may be revenge for some real or fancied injustice encountered on the
job. See Miles, supra note 30, at 210. However, there do not seem to be any statistically
relevant studies upon which to base a definitive conclusion.
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often occurs when the press reports the story of a computer
crime .7  The facts are often presented with a tongue-in-cheek
tone, even by legal journals, 7 and the public is subtly encouraged
to admire the cleverness and derring-do of the criminal rather
than to condemn the crime. The impersonal nature of the "vic-
tim" (a machine, a large firm, a bank) surely has much to do with
this public attitude. However, this heroizing is ill-advised, since
even non-malicious access to a forbidden data base could have
tragic consequences. 8 Business and government are beginning to
realize the potential damage that unauthorized computer use can
wreak, and are attempting to deal with the problem using both
technical 79 and lega 80 weapons.
Another problem is that large businesses, universities and fi-
nancial institutions tend not to report incidents of computer
abuse, fraud, or theft.81 If the abuse is committed by an employee,
a company, in order to protect its reputation of competence, in-
76. See, e.g., Microkid Raids: The FBI Cracks Down, TIME, Oct. 24, 1983, at 59
(thousands of teenagers use home computers and telephones to break into larger systems
around the country); Data Gathered, supra note 28, at 14, col. 3 ("legendary" teenager
reported to have shut down the telephone directory assistance board in Pasadena, broke
into a computerized lineage of thoroughbred horses, destroyed half a data bank, breaking
the code of U.S. Leasing International's computer, and altered or destroyed data worth
$250,000).
77. See, e.g., Ohleand & Berreby, In Flux: A Grave Development on the Computer Front,
Nat'l L.J., Apr. 26, 1982, at 47, col. 1 (accounts payable clerk created, false company in
name of child who died at the approximate time her boyfriend was born, made several
payments to account, then erased computer record, quit job, and went on spree with stolen
money).
78. There were conflicting reports concerning the Milwaukee students' break-in of the
Sloan-Kettering computer system described, supra note 1. One report indicated that one
day's billings for a physician were wiped out. See Drinkard, supra note 1, at A-8. Another
report, however, was more ominous; it stated that the medical records of some cancer pa-
tients under radiation treatments were altered. Laws in U.S. Called Inadequate to Block Abuse
of Computers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1983, at 42, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Laws Called
Inadequate].
79. Computer Security, supra note 1, at 127 (dialback systems request password from the
caller, disconnect, then automatically dial back number of user with that password; encryp-
tion systems encode data before transmission; use of identification codes). See also Gillard &
Smith, Computer Crime: A Growing Threat, BYTE, Oct. 1983, at 398, 414 (description of the
newest security techniques-voice and fingerprint recognition).
80. See infra notes 100-46 (federal and state legislative response), 147-205 (New York
State legislative response) and accompanying text.
81. Raysman & Brown, supra note 26, at 2, col. 2; Computer Security, supra note 1, at
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tegrity, and inviolability,82 may choose to handle the problem with
employment sanctions rather than risk public exposure of the cul-
prit, since to disclose the wrongdoing might reveal internal proce-
dures or weaknesses in the system.8 3 This dearth of reported com-
puter crimes makes it much more difficult for law enforcement
and legislatures to gather information which might help them
gain experience with this type of crime for the purposes of future
prevention and prosecution.8 4
Finally, computer technologists argue that unused computer
time which would be completely wasted otherwise should be avail-
able to anyone who has the skill to take advantage of it. "This
perquisite .. . is a part of the short tradition of computing," 5
and to criminalize such behavior, technologists believe, would, in
itself, be a crime, because it would stifle the creative instinct of
programmers and technological people who learn by "playing
around with" computers.8 "
5. Civil versus criminal penalties. One of the thorniest problems
legislators must solve is choosing which approach to take in rela-
tion to "the most ubiquitous computer related abuse-that of un-
authorized, though legal, use of computer services. 81 7 For exam-
ple, employees who have authority to use a computer in the
course of their work may also use it during lunch hours or after
work for personal purposes which are not per se criminal. One
argument for imposing civil rather than criminal penalties for this
type of abuse is that business ought to bear some of the burden
for policing the use of its own computers. Furthermore,
"[r]emedial civil liability is more appropriate than criminal sanc-
tions because it will require the abuser to compensate the true vic-
82. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 359.
83. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note\71, at 2.
84. Donn B. Parker, computer security expert, was named project director of Stan-
ford Research Institute's study for the U.S. Dep't of Justice. The new study will detail
prosecutions in 18 states which have computer fraud laws. Data Gathered, supra note 28, at
14, col. 3.
85. D. PARKER, supra note 36, at 138-39. For an explanation of computer timesharing
and "idle" time, see Roddy, supra note 68, at 355 n.95 (rebutting Taber's argument by
pointing out that free computer time was classified as property in U.S. v. Sampson, 6 Com-
puter L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 879 (N.D. Cal. 1978)).
86. See generally Taber, supra note 25.
87. Note, Misappropriation of Computer Services: The Need to Enforce Civil Liability, 4 CoM-
PUTER/L.J. 401, 401 (1983).
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tim of the misappropriation. Thus, compensation serves to make
the injured party whole while simultaneously deterring the abuser
from committing the wrongful behavior again. "88
In drafting appropriate provisions, lawmakers must decide
where to draw the line between civil and criminal liability. Per-
haps intent to defraud might be the benchmark. With regard to
damages or punishments allowable, they must also consider
whether to create penalties in relation to the amount of personal
gain to the perpetrator or the amount of loss to the victim. 9
Because of a lack of previous experience in dealing with com-
puter crime9 0 and a dearth of reliable statistics upon which to base
informed opinions,91 legislators, computer crime experts, and
computer technologists find themselves differing sharply on the
best legislative approach to the problem. They disagree on
whether to enact completely new legislation or to amend existing
laws, and whether to support federal or state legislation, or
both.92
Many authorities favor enactment of new legislation specifi-
cally directed at computer abuse and advance a number of reasons
to show why such new legislation is necessary.93 They assert, for
example, that computer users are uniquely. vulnerable as victims
because of the sensitivity of data or potentially greater amounts of
money involved. Passage of new legislation designed to punish
computer criminals would alert the public, the government, and
computer manufacturers to the pressing need for increased secur-
ity. 4 Further, new- laws are needed to give notice that computer
88. Id. at 401-02.
89. See Virginia Statute Tackles Computer Crime, Misuse, Legal Times of Washington,
Apr. 23, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (first state statute to expressly permit an individual to bring a
private damage suit under state law for computer abuse).
90. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
91. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 23, at iii, 61 (quoting John Taber).
92. Raysman & Brown, supra note 26, at 2, col. 4.
93. Laws Called Inadequate, supra note 78, at 1, col. 1; Ingraham, supra note 35, at
429-30; Comment, supra note 23, at 195.
94. Raysman & Brown, supra note 26, at 2, col. 2. See, e.g., Ognibene, The Law Must
Recognize That Computers Pose National Security Risks, L.A. Daily J., July 21, 1983, at 4, col. 3
("almost everything of value to a corporation is in computers: financial transactions, re-
search, marketing plans, personnel records"; executives of large Japanese computer con-
cern who admitted buying confidential IBM documents could have obtained information
through computers without leaving "an incriminating trail of evidence"); BUREAU OF Jus-
TICE STATISTICS, supra note 23, at ix, 34 (potential of corporate EFT (Electronic Funds
Transfer) crime is high because of large dollar volume of transactions processed each day).
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abuse is increasing,9 5 and that the applicability of current legisla-
tion is uncertain.98 Finally, adequate legislation will make evidence
gathering and prosecution easier,97 reducing the necessity for
prosecutors to rely on related statutes when bringing charges
against computer abusers.
While not conceding that there is such a phenomenon as
computer crime, at least one commentator argues that new legisla-
tion is completely unnecessary, since, "the real legal problems of
computer crime are . . . the results of. . . bungled indictments,
improper prosecution, and in general, a lack of understanding of
the law.. . . [I]n every known case in which a real crime occurred,
the prosecutor has been able to secure a conviction under one or
more existing laws."98
95. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 374. Parker emphasizes other reasons why computer
crime deserves our attention: "[T]he occupations of the perpetrators, the methods of the
crime, its environment, the forms of assets involved, timing (milliseconds and less), and
geography (long-distance computer communication) can differ markedly [from traditional
crime situations] when computers are involved, and thus warrant special treatment."
Parker, supra note 23, at 334; D. PARKER, supra note 36, at 244.
96. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 375. Another commentator asserts that
[a] person potentially subject to a criminal law . . . is entitled to a non-elastic
reading of law to properly forewarn him that the conduct is sanctioned ...
Furthermore, extension of the scope of a law by the courts to bring certain
activities not foreseen by the draftsmen within its scope may encroach on the
legislative function, a boundary judges strive not to cross.
Roddy, supra note 67, at 352, n.74. In this connection, Judge Juviler stated in People v.
Weg, 113 Misc. 2d 1017, 1023, 450 N.Y.S.2d 957, 961 (1982), that New York may "find a
need to regulate, even by penal sanction" conduct such as Weg's, but the judge refused to
encroach on the legislature's function. See N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
97. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 374, 375. Concerning the last two points, it is "absurd,"
according to one federal prosecutor who is in favor of new legislation, to "[require] that
the victim prepare evidence of an injury other than that with which he is really concerned
.... " Ingraham, supra note 35, at 430. "The so-called computer crime bills have recog-
nized and sought to redress this problem." Id. He continues:
To the extent that the law prohibits theft, it is difficult to see the social benefit
of compelling the prosecutor to characterize the forbidden activities in a less
than accurate guise in order to pass the law's threshold. Burglary and rape, for
example, need not be prorated in a rental mode to obtain the law's protection,
because the interest that each law protects is recognized as deserving protec-
tion. Information, regarded by government, industry, and academia as a signifi-
cant item of value, deserves no less protection.
Id. at 434.
98. Taber, supra note 87, at 527, 528 (emphasis added, citation omitted). Taber's defi-
nition of "real crime" does not include the kinds of activities described supra note 24 and
accompanying text. See also D. PARKER, supra note 36, at 240 (most prosecutors able to
bring charges under existing laws).
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Legislative action is necessary for a variety of reasons,9 9 some
of which are similar to problems inherent in all white-collar crime
and some of which are unique to computer crime. If additional
legislation will reduce ambiguities in the law, then it behooves leg-
islators to act accordingly. But addressing the problem with com-
pletely new legislation could be superfluous, confusing, and may
lead to inequities. On the other hand, a judicious combination of
new provisions and appropriately amended legislation would cer-
tainly be a more effective means of reducing those ambiguities. As
developed in the following sections of this Comment, a hybrid ap-
proach would be the most sensible and effective legislative course,
at least in New York. Some provisions, such as existing fraud and
embezzlement statutes, can be effectively applied to the computer
criminal who uses a computer as a tool to defraud banks or other
businesses. However, these laws are inadequate to deal with those
who access computers without authorization to obtain or destroy
information.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Because of the problem of prosecutorial discretion discussed
above,100 one argument against enactment of federal computer
crime legislation is that it would be more harmful than helpful to
small business victims. If the losses of these victims were relatively
small, overburdened prosecutors might not have enough staff or
funding to pursue their causes, with the unfortunate result that
they could be left without an effective remedy.
One Congressional response to this dilemma has been the pas-
sage of the "Small Business Computer Crime Act." 101 Recognizing
that "[a]fter a computer crime is committed, the small business-
man may not be able to rely on the criminal justice system for
help,1102 and that "[f]aw enforcement officials encourage the pre-
ventive approach which costs far less than . . . a successfully pros-
ecuted case,"11 3 the Act amends the Small Business Act to create a
task force to study the effects of computer crime on small busi-
99. Laws Called Inadequate, supra note 78, at 1, col. 1.
100. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
101. Small Business Computer Security and Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
362, 98 Stat. 431 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Computer Security and Education Act].
102. H.R. REP. No. 423, Part I, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983).
103. Id.
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nesses.04 A resource center responsible for the dissemination of
information regarding computer crime will be established to help
evaluate available security systems. 105 The House Committee on
Small Business concluded that this Act would be "an inexpensive,
common sense response to the growing problem of computer
crime against small business" and that it would enable small con-
cerns to better evaluate the security of their computer systems so
that the losses due to crimes committed by computer can be
minimized." 106
The main thrust of this legislation, then, is'as a cost-cutting,
preventive, informational measure. These are admirable purposes,
but do not effectively address the problem of prosecutorial discre-
tion. Although the Act might prove to be a valuable adjunct to
effective state legislation, passage of such state legislation also
should be encouraged in order to deal adequately with the impact
of computer crime on small businesses. Given the geographic
breadth and jurisdictional complexity of computer crime, 10 7 addi-
tional federal legislation is needed as well.
Because of the multistate and interstate nature of computer operations, and
especially because of developing computer networks, uniform state legisla-
tion on computer-related crime would be most effective. Since achieving uni-
formity in state laws is unlikely, however, federal law may be essential, espe-
cially in cases where the interpretation depends on facts, concepts, and
evidence that are themselves so dependent on technology. (citation
omitted)10 8
If it is conceded that federal legislation is desirable, what kind
of federal legislation would be effective? As yet, Congress has not
agreed on an answer. No federal computer crime law has been
passed, although several bills have been introduced, and each has
suffered the twin criticisms of being both too general and too
specific.
The first federal legislation was introduced in 1977109 and
104. Computer Security and Education Act, supra note 101, § 3.
105. Id. § 4.
106. H.R. REP. No. 423, supra note 102, at 6.
107. See generally THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY, supra note 18, at 21 (discussion of world-
wide expansion of computer use). One implication of the tremendous growth rate of com-
puter use is that perhaps some modifications will have to be made to international law to
accommodate technological advances.
108. Volgyes, supra note 55, at 400.
109. S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman of the Sub-
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submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The following year,
the bill's sponsor, Senator Abraham Ribicoff, introduced S.
240,110 a slightly modified computer-crimes act, but like the first
bill, it, too, was never reported out of committee. Some discussion
of the weaknesses of this proposed legislation is warranted, since
these bills seem to be the starting point of many legislators' think-
ing on the subject of how to draft a computer crime bill.l aa
The Ribicoff bills would have criminalized two types of com-
puter-related behavior. The first is "computer fraud": using a
computer to plan or execute a fraud or to fraudulently obtain
"money, property or services . ,, ." The bill also would have
criminalized intentional, unauthorized access to a computer, or
the alteration, damage or destruction of a computer, computer
software or data.11 3 Conviction of either offense would result in a
substantial fine, up to fifteen-years imprisonment, or both. ix4
S. 240 was immediately criticized by some computer experts
sympathetic to the technologists' point of view as being much too
broad in scope, since the "intentional and unauthorized access"
language would have criminalized much "incidental personal use
[that] is without pecuniary motive." 115 Moreover, the provision
criminalizing the use of a computer to devise a scheme to defraud
would have made a criminal of anyone who created such a scheme
but never actually put it into practice.
In addition, the bill's definition of "computer" came under
attack 'from two sides. The bill defined a computer as "an elec-
tronic device which performs logical, arithmetic, and memory
functions by the manipulation of electronic or magnetic im-
committee on Governmental Affairs, sponsored the bill as a result of studies made by his
subcommittee. IsSUE BRIEF, supra note 71, at 5.
110. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
111. State statutes based on S. 240: Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301, 13-2316 (West
1982 & Supp. 1984-1985); CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101, 102 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1984);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 752.791-.797 (West Supp. 1968-1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-
16A-1 to -4 (Michie Supp. 1984); and RI. GEN. LAws §§ 11-52-1 to -4 (1981).
112. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1028(a) (1979).
113. Id. § 1028(b).
114. Id. § 1028(a) (fine would be "not more than two and one half times the amount
of the fraud or theft), § 1028(b) (fine would be up to $50,000). According to Roddy, supra
note 67, at 351, "[t]he drafters believed that the potentially disastrous economic effect of
large scale computer crimes warranted an appropriate response."
115. Taber, supra note 25, at 530.
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pulses. ' 116 Unfortunately, this definition is broad enough to in-
clude such devices as pocket calculators, memory typewriters, and
some digital watches, thus making the unauthorized use of these
devices a crime. 117 At the same time, others complained that the
too-specific language of the definition limited coverage to current
technology, and thus advances in that technology would immedi-
ately result in outmoded provisions. 1 "
In 1983, Representative Bill Nelson, who drafted Florida's
computer-crimes act119 as a state legislator, introduced H.R.
1092,120 which is based in part on S. 240. This proposed federal
legislation attempts to improve on the shortcomings of the previ-
ous bills, but does so with limited success. Like the Ribicoff bills,
the new bill's coverage is broad; it would protect all federal com-
puter systems, those of federally insured financial institutions, and
those which engage in interstate commerce or use interstate facili-
ties.121 The basic framework of H.R. 1092 is also similar to that of
the Ribicoff bills in that its intent is to prohibit the use of a com-
puter for fraud or theft and to criminalize the damage or destruc-
tion of computer-stored information.122
The new bill goes further, however. In an apparent effort to
protect authorized users of computer programs and systems
against deliberate interference from intruders such as hackers or
116. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1028(c)(2) (1979).
117. Taber, supra note 25, at 532.
118. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 380 (quoting Nycum's criticisms of the federal bill). See
also D. PARKER, supra note 36, at 241-42 (extensive discussion of language used in defini-
tion of "computer").
119. Florida Computer Crimes Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01-.07 (West Supp. 1984).
120. 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The current Congress has five bills pending from its
1983 session which deal in some way with computer-related crime. Of these, H.R. 1092
and H.R. 4301 deal directly with computer fraud and abuse and impose rather substantial
penalties for these activities. H.R. 4801 states:
Whoever willfully uses a computer capable of being programed and
reprogramed in the course of normal operations, in a manner not authorized
by the owner, shall, if such affects interstate or foreign commerce, in addition
to any other punishment provided for the course of conduct which provided
the elements of the offense under this section, be fined up to $100,000 or im-
prisoned not more than ten years or both. [Courts] shall not suspend the sen-
tence in the case of a conviction of a person under this section or give that
person a probationary sentence, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed
under this section run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for
an offense based on such course of conduct.
121. H.R. 1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1028(a)(1), (2).
122. Id. § 1028(b).
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disgruntled employees, 123 one provision would criminalize inten-
tional and unauthorized "denial of the use of a computer, a com-
puter program, or stored information" to any rightful user.124 An
example of this type of abuse might occur if a fired employee
sabotaged a computer program before leaving "by planting a
'logic bomb' in the program, set to trigger at a specific date, shut-
ting down the computer and preventing it from restarting.
1 25
Unfortunately, the words, "intentional denial of the use of a
computer to any rightful user" can be interpreted to cover widely
varying contexts. Similar language has been incorporated into
proposed New York legislation. 126 A critic1 27 of the New York bill
offers a construction of that phrase which is equally plausible, es-
pecially to those without a technical background: language penal-
izing the intentional, unauthorized denial of computer services
could conceivably make a criminal act out of a "mere, albeit delib-
erate, breach of contract to provide such computer services. 1 2
Or, in yet another reading of the phrase, "if the [drafters'] intent
• ..was to add criminal penalties to a situation where some form
of political demonstration deliberately disrupted the operations of
a computer facility, . . . existing statutes must suffice, or else the
123. See supra notes 1-9, 30, and accompanying text.
124. H.R. 1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1028(b) (1983). The full text of this provision
reads:
Whoever intentionally and without authorization damages a computer de-
scribed in subsection (a) or intentionally and without authorization causes or
attempts to cause the withholding or denial of the use of a computer, a com-
puter program or stored information shall be fined not more than $50,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years or both.
Cf the language of § 1028(b) in the Ribicoff bill, which deals with this issue:
Whoever intentionally and without authorization, directly or indirectly accesses,
alters, damages, destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy any computer, com-
puter system, or computer network described in subsection (a), or any computer
software, program or data contained in such computer, computer system or
computer network, shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not
more than fifteen years or both.
S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
125. Growing Computer Crime, supra note 29, at 1, col. 6.
126. N.Y.S. 3080, 206th Sess. (1983). See also infra notes 154-59 and accompanying
text.
127. Letter from Walter Klasson, primary author of LEGISLATION REP'T No. 125 and S.
494, proposed N.Y. statute, to Amalia M. Wagner (Dec. 13, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Klasson Letter].
128. SUBCOMM. ON COMPUTER L. OF THE COMM. ON Bus. L. OF THE BANKING CORP. & Bus.
L. SECTION, LEGISLATION REPORT No. 125, at 19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATION
REP'T No. 125].
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legislature should draft unambiguous legislation with this specific
object in mind. ' 129 Since the language of this part of the provision
lends itself so readily to these different constructions, it should be
modified to reflect more clearly the drafters' intentions.
The basic definition of computer in H.R. 1092180 is an im-
provement over the one used in S. 240 because it differentiates
between computers used in a business situation and those used for
personal purposes. Also, although at present most computers are
based on electronic technology, the new bill's definition takes note
of possible changes and advances in this area and is careful to in-
clude any business computing device regardless of the technology
used in its construction." In an attempt to meet the criticisms of
overbreadth leveled against past definitions of "computer," H.R.
1092 specifically excludes those computers "designed and manu-
factured for, and. . . used exclusively for routine, personal, fam-
ily, or household purposes," provided that they are not linked in
some way to another computer. 3 2 As examples of excluded de-
vices, the bill mentions "automated typewriter" or "portable
hand-held calculator.' 3 But the specificity of the exclusions is a
two-edged sword: in a few years, this language could prove to be a
severe limitation as technology once again exceeds available legis-
lative labels.'"
129. Id.
130. H.R. 1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1028(c)(1) (1983).
131. "[E]lectronic, magnetic, optical, hydraulic, organic or other high speed data
processing device . Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Parker responds: "Don't exclude devices; only exclude uses if necessary.
Leave it to the courts to decide what is a computer and a significant violation within the
technology of the times." D. PARKER, supra note 36, at 242.
134. Id. For example, the newest portable computers now weigh less than ten pounds
and run on batteries. Too broad a definition of "computer" would include digital watches
and calculators. Too narrow a definition would exclude technological changes. An example
of a broad definition is "an internally programmed, automatic device that performs data
processing." Florida Computer Crimes Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.03(2) (West Supp. 1984).
A more narrow definition is Colorado's: "an electronic device which performs logical,
arithmetic, or memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses,
and includes all input, output, processing, storage, software, or communication facilities
which are connected or related to such a device in a system or network." CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 18-5.5-101(2) (Supp. 1982).
Current technology already includes voice control of computers, see Gillard & Smith,
supra note 79, at 416, and computers that "see," INFOSYSTEMS, Nov. 1983, at 14. See also
News & Comment: Hello, Computer, COMPuTER DEcISIONS, Oct. 1983, at 39 (voice recognition
device recognizes up to 25,000 words, replaces microcomputer keyboard, with implications
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In addition, objections to criminalizing the activities of tech-
nologists who use their employers' systems to "play" have not
been entirely met. Although the bill includes a provision which
requires a willful intent to damage the system or otherwise to pre-
vent authorized users from using the computer services, 13 5 it also
makes it a crime to "use . . .a computer. . .[t]o knowingly con-
vert . . .the property of another." 13 The definition of property
includes computer services,' 3 7 and computer services include
"computer data processing and storage functions."' 3 Conceiva-
bly, then, an employee using his or her employer's computer to
store personal information could come under the ambit of this
provision. However, in some instances, it probably should. Some
prosecutorial discretion in the area of unauthorized use by em-
ployees might be advantageous, and appropriate civil penalties
could be used to provide for this situation.'39
Thus, although federal legislation is, on the whole, desirable
given the inadequacy of present federal and state statutes in deal-
ing with computer crime,' 40 and while this bill is an improvement
in some respects over the Ribicoff bills, "[t]he unnecessary jargon
and overemphasis on the drafter's 'computer literacy' has pro-
duced a bill which . . .is unclear as to purpose and meaning.''
Some further refinements and clarifications are necessary before
the bill, if enacted, will have the desired effectiveness as federal
legislation.
At least twenty state legislatures 142 have responded to the
for the handicapped as well as for business); Optical Memory Could Make Today's Storage Obso-
lete, SMALL SYSTEMS WORLD, Oct. 1983, at 20 (8000 pages of typewritten text on card the
size of a plastic credit card; advent of optical memory systems compared to Gutenberg's
invention of moveable type); Kashner, Business Trends: We Have Seen the Future and It Is Al
[Artificial Intelligence], ELECTRONic BUSINESS, Nov. 1983, at 36 (description of "computer
based products that imitate human thought patterns").
135. H.R. 1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1028(a)(1)-(2).
136. Id. § 1028(a) (1983).
137. Id. § 1028(c)(3) (1983).
138. Id. § 1028(c)(4) (1983).
139. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
141. See Kasson Letter, supra note 127 (discussing H.R. 1092). Mr. Klasson's opinion
of the definition of "computer medium" in § 1028(c)(7) of the bill is that it "verges on the
metaphysical."
142. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.985 (Supp. 1983); ARm REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
2301, 13-2316 (West 1978 & Supp. 1984-1985); CAL PENAL CODE § 504 (West Supp. 1983);
CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5.5101, 102 (Supp. 1984); DE. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 931-961 (Supp.
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problem of computer abuse. However, the confusion about how
to conceptualize computer crime, what actions to criminalize and
what sanctions to put on those actions is evidenced by the fact that
the types of behavior covered and the penalties imposed in each
statute vary from mere violations, even for fraudulent activities,
depending on the value of the improper use involved, to felonies,
even for simple, unauthorized use by an employee.1 43 These col-
lected state statutes have been called "a terrible patchwork,"
144
and some reports indicate that the effectiveness of state legislation
has been limited. 14 5 For example,
[a]bsent the determination of the value of stolen or damaged software, or
...evidence of the computer abuser's fraudulent intent, criminal prosecu-
tions under many state computer crime statutes are cumbersome ....
Some prosecutors and judges who have specific computer crime statutes at
their disposal, are reluctant to apply them to computer abuses because the
statutes are simply variations on larceny or damage to property statutes ...
[D]epending upon the wording of the statute, the same valuation problems
that arise when employing conventional criminal statutes to computer crime
may arise even in those states with specific computer crime provisions. 146
III. ACTION BY THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE
New York State also has experienced the uncertainty and
problems associated with a lack of appropriate computer crime
legislation. Recently, in People v. Weg,147 a computer programmer
working for the New York City Board of Education 'was charged
with theft of services for using the Board's computer for his own
1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01-.07 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-90-93
(1984); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 15-1, 16.9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 752.791-.797 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.87-.89
(West Supp. 1984); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 569.093-.099 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-1-205, 45-2-101, 45-2-103, 45-1-104 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16A-14
(Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453-457 (1981); OHIO CODE ANN. §§ 2901.01, 2913.01
(Page Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-52-1.-.5. (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-701-
704 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-98.1 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (West Supp.
1984-1985).
143. See Comment, supra note 24, at 203-04. See, e. g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.06(1),
(2)a (offenses against computer uses; felony calling for term of imprisonment of up to five
years and a fine of up to $5000).
144. D. PARKER, supra note 36, at 242.
145. Comment, supra note 24, at 203.
146. Id.
147. 113 Misc. 2d 1017, 450 N.Y.S.2d 957.
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benefit. 1 4 The issue was whether the computer in the school
board office, a public institution, constituted "business, industrial
or commercial equipment" under New York State's theft of ser-
vices provision.14 9 The statute requires that the services in ques-
tion be "business" services, and that they be used to create a
"commercial or other substantial" benefit for the alleged thief.150
In Weg, the charges were dismissed because the computer be-
longed to a governmental agency and, therefore, could not be
considered "business, industrial, or commercial equipment. 1 5 1
Moreover, Weg did not realize any pecuniary benefit from his ac-
tivities . 52 Weg claimed that these activities were commonplace
and that he was being prosecuted in order to make an example of
him.153 Legislators, attempting to avoid such unfortunate situa-
tions in the future, have introduced four computer crime bills, all
of which are now pending before the New York State legislature.
The first, S. 3080, 5. is modeled after one of the original fed-
eral bills, S. 240,1"5 and the Florida statute; 56 that is, it is a "stand
alone" statute, and creates an entirely new article in the penal law
to deal with crimes termed "computer fraud" and "computer
damage or destruction.' 57 Like the Florida statute, it places com-
puter programs and data into a category called. "intellectual
property."' 5 18
A New York State Bar Association Report succinctly points
out some of the shortcomings of this bill:
The two defined crimes, "Computer fraud". . . and "Computer damage or
destruction" . . . , do not necessarily cover in a rational manner the variety
of types of conduct to be addressed. "Computer fraud" appears in part to
148. Id. at 1018, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
149. Id. at 1019, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
150. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(8) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
151. Weg, 113 Misc. 2d at 1019, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
152. Id. at 1024, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 961. See also N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
153. Raysman & Brown, supra note 26, at 2, col. 3.
154. N.Y.S. 3080, 206th Sess. (1983).
155. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
156. Fi.A STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01-.07 (West Supp. 1984).
157. N.Y.S. 3080, 206th Sess. §§ 186.00, 186.10 (1983).
158. FI. STAT. ANs. § 815.03(1) (West Supp. 1984); N.Y.S. 3080, 206th Sess. at §
196.00(9) (1983). This categorization has been criticized as superfluous, since there is "no
reason to single out computer data for identification as 'intellectual property' when other
products of the human intellect are not so defined in [New York State's] Penal Law." LEC-
ISLATION REP'T No. 125, supra note 128, at 9.
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duplicate other Penal Law provisions (e.g., larceny, fraud), but may be useful
in that it does define, through the inclusion of "information" in the defini-
tion of property, a crime related to the theft of computerized information,
Arguably, this function could more easily be accomplished by modifying the
definition of "property" in the "larceny" article, Penal Law § 155.00 (this
was the approach used to address the problem of theft of cable television
services... ).159
The second proposed statute, S. 3890,160 in contrast, uses a
very simple approach to the problem by merely proposing to
amend the definitions of property in the criminal mischief' 61 and
larceny162 sections of the penal law to make computer programs,
software, systems and networks "property" for the purposes of
these sections. Aside from some serious doubt which may exist
about the wording of some of the definitions of computer termi-
nology,163 this scheme has the advantage of simplicity and would
actually be fairly comprehensive, including within the ambit of the
modified provisions such comptter-related abuses as theft or de-
struction of programs, data, money, and even services. Theft of
services, in turn, could conceivably be interpreted to include un-
authorized computer use.
The criminal mischief statute, as it now stands, penalizes only
damage or destruction of tangible property.1 " Adding computer
software and data to the property definition of this section would
expose a criminal who damages tangible or intangible computer-
related property to gradations of punishment according to the
criminal intent of the perpetrator6 5 and the amount of the dam-
age sustained by the victim, 66 all within a framework of existing,
familiar legislative provisions. By explicitly including computer
programs, systems and networks in the larceny statute, any taking
of such property would be similarly covered.
159. SUBCOMM. ON COMPUTER L. OF THE COMM. OF Bus. L. OF THE BANKING CORP. AND
Bus. L. SECTION, 1982 LEGISLATION REPORT No. 158, at 2, 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LEG-
ISLATION REP'T No. 158] (citation omitted).
160. N.Y.S. 3890, 206th Sess. (1983).
161. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984).
162. Id. §§ 155.00-.45.
163. N.Y.S. 3890, 206th Sess. § 1 (1983). The definitions are taken word for word
from the federal proposal, S. 240, and accordingly suffer from the same weaknesses. See
supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.





Critics of a bill such as this point out, however, that it would
not single out unauthorized computer use by any special proscrip-
tions in the penal law. One school of thought is that this behavior
is potentially serious enough to warrant a separate prohibition. 
1 7
Including computer-related definitions of property under criminal
mischief might not adequately cover this type of abuse, since of-
fenses above a class A misdemeanor in that article require intent to
cause damage on the part of the perpetrator."" In many situations
where employees or hackers, for example, break security codes to
"play around" with a computer's files without authorization but
do not intend to cause harm, the potential for damage can still be
very serious. 69 Should public policy mandate the use of severe
penalties for unintentional damage to computer programs or data
in order to discourage unauthorized use of a computer? Again,
the definition of "computer crime" is significant. Privacy and
property concepts are involved, and legislators must make some
rather difficult choices as to what values to protect. Questions
arise as to whether civil penalties are more appropriate, as to the
extent of a business's responsibility to protect its own sensitive
data, and as to whether computer files in government agencies
should be especially protected by law.
The third proposed statute, S. 494,70 answers the above criti-
cism. It contains one new provision dealing specifically with com-
puter crime: a prohibition against unauthorized computer use.171
It does not, however, contain separate provisions for computer
fraud or computer damage or destruction.
The definition of "computer" in S. 494172 is one of the least
167. LEGiSLATiON REP'T No. 125, supra note 128, at 17.
168. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984). Section
145.05 (criminal mischief in the fourth degree) requires intentional damage of another's
property or reckless damage in an amount exceeding $250.00. Id. § 145.05. The permissi-
ble penalties for this offense range from a prison sentence of one year to unconditional
discharge.
169. LF tsLATIoN REP'T No. 125, supra note 128, at 18. See also Laws Called Inadequate,
supra note 76, at 42, col. 1.
170. N.Y.S. 494, N.Y.A. 576, 206th Sess. (1983).
171. Id. §§ 186.00-.30.
172. Id. § 186.00(1). As used in this provision, "computer" means a device or group
of devices which, pursuant to a computer program, can automatically perform arithmetic,
logical, storage and retrieval operations with or on computer data and can communicate
the results, and includes any connected or directly related device, equipment or facility
which enables the computer to store, retrieve or communicate to or from a person, an-
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technical of all the definitions thus far discussed. It incorporates
broader concepts such as "computer system" and "computer net-
work" and leaves ample room for future technological advances.
However, in its simplicity, it allows for the inclusion of calculators,
typewriters, and watches. This is not a serious drawback, since the
bill also differentiates between uses of computers, and exempts
personal uses from the proscriptions provided for abuses of busi-
ness computers.
The bill's stand-alone provision calls for gradations in punish-
ment for unauthorized computer use, 17  and also incorporates
penalties for using a computer in the commission of another
crime. This section would thus mandate a double penalty: a pen-
alty for the crime committed with the use of the computer, and a
penalty for using the computer as an instrumentality of the crime.
The bill's drafters reason that, while the double-penalty structure
is undesirable in relation to use of the computer for fraudulent
activities (since existing state statutes are adequate in that area),2
7 4
the penalties mandated for unauthorized computer use are not
unduly harsh, and these provisions will serve as much-needed no-
tice that such behavior can be dangerously destructive . 7
Instead of creating further provisions to deal with abuses such
as computer fraud or computer damage or destruction, the re-
mainder of S. 494 would modify existing statutes to include these
abuses within the definitions of traditional crimes such as larceny,
theft of services, and tampering with public records7'7
The fourth and newest bill is S. 8977,177 a "program bill"
17 8
developed by the New York State Attorney General's office. S.
8977 defines and proscribes two new categories of criminal behav-
ior. The first is "computer trespass," which prohibits breaking se-
other computer or another device the results of computer operations, computer programs,
or computer data.
173. Id. §§ 186.10-.30 (penalties range from class B misdemeanor to class A misde-
meanor to class E felony).
174. LEGISLATION REP'T No. 125, supra note 128, at 13.
175. Id. at 18.
176. N.Y.S. 494, N.Y.A. 576, 206th Sess. § 4-10 (1983).
177. N.Y.S. 8977, 207th Sess. (1984) (introduced by Sen. T. Stafford and Assembly-
man W. Murphy on Apr. 19, 1984).
178. A "program bill" is a bill drafted by a department or agency of the state (in this
case, the Attorney General's office) and introduced into the legislature by a sponsor (here,
Sen. Thomas Stafford).
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curity codes in order to use a computer without authorization.7 9
This offense is classed as a misdemeanor. 80 However, the charge
escalates to a felony,18' and the requirement that a security code
be broken is omitted if the unauthorized use is for the purpose of
committing another felony. Again, this reflects the drafters' opin-
ion that this situation warrants a double penalty.
The same double-penalty scheme is used for a second new
category of criminal behavior, "computer tampering,"' 82 defined
as intentional and unauthorized destruction of computer data or
programs. The felony charge applies under this provision if the
perpetrator uses the computer without authorization to commit
another felony, or if the perpetrator was previously convicted of
computer abuse either under the larceny provisions or under the
theft of computer services provision. 3
The remainder of the bill. is devoted to proposed amend-
ments of five sections of the penal law.' 4 For example, the new
definitions of "property" and "deprive" of section 155.00, the lar-
ceny provision, would be amended to encompass computer-related
material.8 5 The amendments are designed to define as "prop-
erty" computer services and computer material in any form,
179. Id. § 146.05. The bill's drafters chose to make breaking a security code part of
the language of this provision to eliminate the possibility that an employee with authoriza-
tion to use a computer would come under the ambit of the provision, regardless of the
nature of that use. They reasoned that employee misuse is a matter best regulated by the
employer, since business has an obligation to protect its property. Telephone interview
with James Cantwell, member of Sen. Stafford's staff (June 1, 1984).
180. N.Y.S. 8977, 207th Sess. § 146.05 (1984). A Class A misdemeanor carries a max-
imum sentence of one year, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 1975), and a fine of up to
$1000 or two times the amount of gain from the offense, id. § 80.05, or up to $5000 if the
offense is committed by a corporation, id. § 80.10. See also NEW YORK SENTENCE CHARTS
1985 (West 1985), at 15, for alternative permissible dispositions.
181. N.Y.S. 8977, 207th Sess. § 146.10 (1984). A Class E felony carries a maximum
sentence of four years, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1975), and a fine of up to
$5000 or two times the amount of gain from the offense, id. § 80.00, or up to $10,000 or
two times the amount of gain from the offense if the offense is committed by a corporation,
id. § 80.10. See also NEW YORK SENTENCE CHARTS 1985 (West 1985), at 12, for alternative
permissible dispositions.
182. N.Y.S. 8977, 207th Sess. § 146.20-.25 (1984).
183. Id. § 146.25.
184. Other amended provisions include: § 165.07 (unlawful use of secret scientific ma-
terial); § 165.15 (theft of services); § 170.00 (forgery, which defines computer data or pro-
grams as written instruments for purposes of crime of forgery); and § 175.00(2)-(3) (which
now include computer data and programs within definitions of "business record" and
"written instrument" for purpose of false written statements).
185. N.Y.S. 8977, 207th Sess. § 146.00(5) (1984).
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whether as programs, printouts, or data which is stored internally
in the computer's memory. '86 In addition, the definition of "com-
puter material" attempts to address one of the primary concerns
expressed above, that the valuation of the program lies in its util-
ity to the owner, not in any assessment of its tangible worth. 187
A drawback of the language of the bill, however, is that it
does not solve the problem which arises when material is copied
from one computer to another but not reduced to tangible
form.18 8 Section 146.00(5) of the bill defines "computer material"
as "property" and specifies that it
means any computer data or computer program which is not, and is not
intended to be, available to anyone other than the person or persons right-
fully in possession thereof or selected persons having access thereto with his
or their consent, which accords or may accord such rightful possessors an
advantage over competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or
the benefit thereof, and, in the case of reproduction or recording, which
reproduction or recording is not for home or personal use or is intended for
resale.8 9
The bill also enlarges the provision prohibiting the unlawful use
of secret scientific material by adding computer material.190 The
problem becomes evident on analysis of the language of Section
155.05 of New York State's Penal Law, which sanctions larceny
and the unauthorized use of property. To be guilty of offense
under the larceny statute, a person must be acting "with intent to
deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself
or a third person . . . ."19 "Deprive" and "appropriate" are de-
fined as withholding or exercising control over property, "perma-
nently, or . . . under such circumstances that the major portion
of its economic value or benefit is lost to [the owner]." ' 2
Consequently, the new bill may not cover the situation where
computer material is copied from one computer to another, but
still remains in the original computer. Destruction of the material
in the original computer in addition to the transfer would make a
person liable under this statute, but it is far from clear that merely
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
189. N.Y.S. 8977, 207th Sess. § 146.00(5) (1984).
190. Id. § 165.07.
191. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05(1) (McKinney 1975) (emphasis added).
192. Id. § 155.00(3), (4).
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copying alone would bring a violator under the ambit of this
provision.
It is possible that the drafters chose to leave this area inten-
tionally ambiguous, since copyright law' 93 might cover many of
these situations. Nevertheless, little imagination is necessary to
construct many situations where neither the civil sanctions of the
copyright laws nor the criminal prohibitions of the larceny statute
would be applicable, even with the addition of "computer materi-
als" to the definition of property in the penal code.
A second major problem lies in the definition of "computer
material," which closely parallels the language used in the defini-
tion of "secret scientific material."' 94 "Computer material" is only
information which "accords . . . rightful possessors an advantage
over competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or
the benefit thereof ... .*" While it is arguably appropriate in
the context of secret scientific material, such language may inject
the prerequisite of competitive advantage too strongly into the
burden-of-proof requirement relating to computer material. This,
in turn, may adversely affect the prosecution for theft of com-
puter material from the computers of government agencies or
not-for-profit corporations. The requirement of competitive ad-
vantage may very well be too narrow to include advantages other
than business advantages obtained by the taking of the
information.
The definition of "computer materials," read in conjunction
with other larceny provisions, also requires proof that the material
taken (if a reproduction or recording) is not intended for home or
personal use or for resale. 96 Many computer hackers "take" in-
formation in these forms "for the fun of it": the language of this
provision could eliminate all prosecution in these cases. Further-
more, the prosecution bears the burden of proof, whereas, in pro-
posed section 165.07 (unlawful use of secret scientific material or
computer material), the person accused must prove that the mate-
rial was "reproduced for home or personal use and was not in-
tended for resale." Consequently, if a prosecutor charged an al-
193. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101, 117 (definitions of "computer program") (limitations on
exclusive rights: computer programs).
194. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(6) (McKinney 1975).




leged thief with larceny for the taking of property under section
155.05, the prosecutor's burden of proof would be more difficult
than if the charge were brought under section 165.07.
The bill also defines computer data as "information . . . [or]
. . . concepts . . . which are being prepared . . . in a formalized
manner .... ."19 This language fails to cover raw data which is
sometimes entered into a computer and stored, to be processed at
a later time.
The definition of the phrase "Uses a computer or computer
service without authorization" 198 presents yet a third problem of
proof for the prosecutor. Use of a computer without permission
of the owner is "without authorization" when the user has actual
knowledge that he is acting without permission or has been given
notice to that effect.'99 If a computer or computer service owner is
unaware that the computer is being used without authorization,
and does not give notice to that effect, the prosecutor must then
prove that the unauthorized user has actual knowledge that he or
she was abusing his or her rights to use the computer.
The juxtaposition of language in the computer trespass provi-
sions may also pose problems for a prosecutor. Proposed section
146.05 (computer trespass in the second degree) requires that the
trespasser overcome a security code. However, this requirement is
not included in the companion section 146.10 (computer trespass
in the first degree), which merely requires that the unauthorized
user knowingly use a computer to commit or attempt to commit a
felony. Thus, if a trespass is committed but the trespasser did not
break a security code, and proof that the computer was used to
commit a felony fails, prosecution under 146.10 fails. The prose-
cutor could not fall back on 146.05, since the "security code" re-
quirement prevents it from being a lesser included offense of
146.10.
Finally, since prosecution under 146.10 is expressly limited to
prosecution for felonies defined in the larceny provisions,200 it ex-
cludes prosecution for federal felonies and for non-penal law felo-
nies such as might be found in banking and securities law.
If these problems can be worked out, S. 8977 would seem to
197. Id. § 146.00(3).
198. N.Y.S. 8977, 207th Sess. § 146.00(6) (1984).
199. Id.
200. Id. § 146.10 ("any felony defined in this chapter").
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be the best approach so far to computer crime legislation. Its defi-
nitions attempt to address the major concerns of valuation and of
striking a balance between generality and specificity. Overall, the
bill does not unnecessarily duplicate existing legislation. "Al-
though . . . some additional provisions must be added to New
York State law in order fully to cover computer related crime,
• . . our Penal Law broadly covers the traditional categories of
crime into which . . . many aspects of computer related crime can
be placed."'" In addition, judges and prosecutors, more familiar
with the language of the existing provisions, will find it easier con-
ceptually to fit computer abuse into the larceny statute, for exam-
ple, if the definition of property is expanded to encompass techni-
cal terms such as "computer program" and "data.
20 2
Moreover, the scheme of gradations of punishment is already
well worked out in the existing statutes; there should be no unfor-
tunate cases of bringing harsh felony charges against program-
mers who use their employer's computer to play Dungeons and
Dragons or to print out calendars. Finally, using the framework of
existing statutes to combat the problem of computer crime has
the advantage of flexibility. New terms can be added and/or defi-
nitions modified as new technology warrants without drastically
changing the law to everyone's confusion.
CONCLUSION
Although the necessity for completely new legislation is
widely advocated, New York, in its legal approach to these
problems, should not focus specifically and exclusively on "com-
puter" crime. State legislators have two options available. They
can adopt new legislation based on federal S. 240,203 creating a so-
called "stand alone statute" which treats computer crime as a
completely separate offense, or they can amend existing statutes
to take into account new situations created by new technology.
The legislators must first carefully determine what actions in
relation to a computer ought to be called criminal and what sanc-
tions should be authorized for each of those actions. This is an
201. LEGISLATION REP'T. No. 125, supra note 128, at 4.
202. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(6) (McKinney 1975) would be amended to include
these terms within the definition of "secret scientific material."
203. See supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
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extremely difficult problem in light of the newness of the technol-
ogy involved. And, indeed, the second consideration with which
legislators must concern themselves is the very newness and rapid-
ity with which these technologies are developing." 4 The laws
passed today must be broad enough to encompass further ad-
vances in technology, yet narrow enough not to criminalize inno-
cent behavior. This would seem to be best accomplished by a care-
ful expansion of the coverage of existing legislation, rather than a
broad-brush approach which could be both overreactive and
counterproductive.
It has been said by those who argue for expanding existing
statutes that there are no new crimes, only new ways of commit-
ting them. Theft is theft, they argue, and it is not necessary to
create an entirely new statute to punish those who steal by using a
computer. A computer, after all, is only a mechanical accomplice.
Others argue that since there are special statutes for armed rob-
bery, hit-and-run offenses, and assault with a deadly weapon, there
also should be a separate statutory prohibition of computer crime.
However, each of these earlier offenses developed out of a need to
provide additional protection against added physical danger posed
by a new technological development. Most of the present concern
about computer crime, on the other hand, arises from the in-
creased risk of monetary loss resulting from the new technology.
Indeed, it should be noted that in the future there may be little
other method of theft; we are on our way to becoming a "cashless,
checkless society. ' 20 5 While computers may also be used to com-
mit crimes which are not purely monetary, such as extortion, sab-
otage, theft of services, or even murder, there is no reason why
the use of present statutes, suitably expanded by the inclusion of
computer terms should not prove adequate and fair.
AMALIA M. WAGNER
204. Compare, S. 240's definition of "computer" with the description of new technol-
ogy involving optical transistors which would replace transistors and electromagnetic im-
pulses in computers. The article also describes work currently in progress to develop or-
ganic transistors, a development made possible by recent breakthroughs in genetic
engineering. Friedman, Searching for a Successor to the Transistor, INFOSYSTEMS, Jan. 1984, at
30.
205. Sokolik, supra note 10, at 357.
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